Like Epictetus, Marcus was far more interested in Stoic ethics—in, that is, its philosophy of life—than in Stoic physics or logic. Indeed, in the Meditations he asserts that it is possible to achieve “freedom, self-respect, unselfishness, and obedience to the will of God” even though we have not mastered logic and physics.34

Their strangely unlimited character is the fundamental reason for traditional theological preoccupation with human intelligence and rational volition when discussing the way humans image God. These faculties are of interest because of their excessive openness to what exceeds their own or any limited nature.

The essence of the good is a certain disposition of our choice, and that of the bad likewise. [2] What are externals, then? Materials for our choice, which attains its own good or ill through the way in which it deals with them. [3] How can it attain the good? By not overvaluing the materials.