Governance rights face similar challenges with both fungible and non-fungible tokens: ownership naturally tends to have a power-law distribution so the question becomes: what do you do about whales? This recent essay by Vitalik paints a clear picture for why this will become an increasingly problematic issue for DAOs, both in terms of incentive mis... See more

Coin Voting allows token holders to participate in decision-making, but most token holders are not well-known (a result of attracting high-APY token holders). Decentralizing governance was delayed rather than building community. Despite the desire for decentralization (for regulatory, idealistic, or scaleable reasons), new alternatives have emerged... See more

In the following paragraphs, I will first argue that the current cryptocurrency market is extremely hostile to the cultivation of token-based DAOs, and then point out a huge flaw that’s intrinsic to token DAOs, and finally provide solutions that will not only help DAOs grow better & faster, but also get rid of the ludicrous idea that the rich shoul... See more

One of the primary issues regarding protocol resolutions comes from the poor execution of mass proposals. The benefit of anyone participating in governance is that they may all propose changes to the core protocol’s functionality. The problem that arises from this is the mixed bag of nonsensical and interesting proposals that are clumped together i... See more