Sublime

As we move from the 1950s to the 1970s and then to 2008, we notice a problem. A perfectly good idea morphed into another good idea, spread beyond housing, and then culminated in uncontrolled insanity. By 2008, no one, including the management of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or the Department of Housing and Urban Development, had any idea of the fragi

In August alone, the fund lost roughly 45 percent of its capital, an event that the fund’s risk analysis predicted should happen no more than once in the history of Western civilization. It shouldn’t be unduly difficult to draw a conclusion about whether LTCM was extremely unlucky, or whether its managers misunderstood the nature of the risk.

Look at any business, talk to anyone you know, and you will see prudent, thoughtful actors. But look at the sum total of their actions, and sometimes it will seem without rhyme or reason, bordering on chaos. The sum of individually rational actions can be the genesis of a crisis.

But if entire nations can be seized by manias—recall Germany in the 1930s—why should we assume that people will always behave rationally when they invest their money?

Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.

The mid-1970s were not a productive time for the markets, which stagnated between 1964 and 1982; the Dow closed at 874 in 1964 and at 875 in 1981, racking up a magnificent gain of one point in seventeen years. Anybody who began investing in the 1990s, and had the expectation that stocks regularly outperform all other investments, should spend a mom

Some highlights have been hidden or truncated due to export limits.