René Girard's Mimetic Theory (Studies in Violence, Mimesis & Culture)

The mimetic theory describes man as a social being that is dependent on relations to others. No human being, in other words, is intrinsically complete.

As long as social difference or any other form of differentiation is present to channel mimetic desire, its conflictual dimension remains contained.

For over two decades, religions—especially those giving rise to fundamentalist groups—have played an increasingly important role on the global stage. The year 1979, in particular, comes to mind, when Ayatollah Khomeini declared Iran an Islamic theocratic state.

The human being wills concord; but nature knows better what is good for his species: it wills discord.

Kierkegaard and Girard consciously place their work in the context of the Christian tradition. For both thinkers, the biblical account of the Fall of Man takes on central significance, whereas Sartre rejects this framework.

We are not autonomous, self-sufficient individuals, but rather beings that are formed through the imitation of models, especially with regard to desire.

Girard expressly praises Sartre’s insistence on man’s “insurmountable” religious nature, in the wake of Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of God.

To better understand this concept, we must examine Girard’s usage of the term “scapegoat” more closely. The term first appears in the book of Leviticus (16) and describes a rite in which the high priest symbolically laid the sins of the community on the back of a goat, which was then cast into the wilderness to the demon Azazel.

As the metaphysical distance between desiring subject and model diminishes—the key component of internal mediation—the potential for rivalry and violence increases.